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History flows in streams that overlap and sometimes shift direction.  From the early 
1980s, just such a shift was discernible in the history of the developed democracies.  For 
thirty years after World War II, their states took on greater roles in the allocation of 
resources, as governments anxious to avoid the social conflicts of the inter-war years 
adopted activist economic policies and generous social benefits to construct a Keynesian 
welfare state (Offe 1983; Eichengreen 2007).  However, economic recession and slower 
rates of growth during the 1970s gave rise to widespread disillusionment with existing 
modes of policy-making.  In reaction, policy-makers began to argue that employment was 
the responsibility of markets rather than governments and growth could be restored only 
by expanding the ambit and competitiveness of markets (Hall 1993; McNamara 1998: 
Blyth 2002). 
The pioneering steps were taken by governments elected under Margaret Thatcher 
in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in 1980.  In the context of widespread fears about national 
decline, they promised to restore the prosperity of the nation by enhancing the role of 
markets vis-à-vis the state in the economy (Krieger 1986). Paradoxically, the initial 
requirement was a more assertive state (Gamble 1988).  The two administrations initiated 
legislation to reduce the power of trade unions and fought high profile battles with British 
miners and American air controllers.  In the name of deregulation, they privatized 
national enterprises contracted out public services, tightened social benefits, and made 
many markets more competitive (King 1987; Vogel 1998; Prasad 2006).  
On the European continent and in Asia, the move to the market came more 
slowly.  The Wende that Helmut Kohl promised Germany in 1984 proved more rhetorical 
than real, and a socialist government under François Mitterrand tried to revive French 
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dirigisme before beginning a string of market-oriented reforms in 1983 (Hall 1986; Wood 
2001).  Other governments were often slower to act.  With the adoption of the Single 
European Act of 1986, the European Community committed itself to more intense market 
competition and turned its Commission into an agent for market liberalization.  By the 
early 1990s, markets were being liberalized in all the OECD countries, and liberalization 
continued until the global financial crisis of 2008. 
In short, the past thirty years have been a neo-liberal era marked by the opening of 
international markets, the intensification of market competition, and the growing 
influence of markets over the allocation of resources.  In labor markets, liberalization has 
featured initiatives to reduce employment protection, to make part-time and temporary 
employment more feasible, to tighten eligibility and replacement rates for unemployment 
or sickness benefits, and to weaken trade unions.  In markets for corporate governance, 
neo-liberal initiatives reduced impediments to foreign direct investment, made corporate 
takeovers more feasible, and increased the power of shareholders relative to stakeholders.  
In markets for goods and services, analogous initiatives reduced barriers to trade, 
privatized public enterprises, encouraged the contracting out of public services, and 
opened markets to new competitors.  Although these initiatives were more intense in 
some countries than others, as Peter Evans and William Sewell note in their chapter for 
this volume, Figure One indicates that the OECD countries moved broadly in these 
directions (cf. Hall and Thelen 2009).   
The object of this chapter is to examine the effects of this turn toward more 
intense market competition on ordinary people in the developed democracies.  We are 
especially interested in the distribution of well-being and the sources of social resilience 
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sustaining it in the neo-liberal era.  How have people fared in the context of this neo-
liberal era?  Are they generally better or worse off?  Which groups have benefited and 
which have lost in the face of these developments? 
The answers to these questions are not obvious.  On the one hand, there is a sound 
rationale in economic theory for expecting intensified market competition to improve 
economic performance and aggregate well-being by stimulating trade, encouraging 
innovation, and reducing consumer prices. On the other hand, intensified competition is 
likely to have restrained wages and made some jobs less secure, while the tightening of 
social benefits disadvantages those in precarious labor-market positions.  Whether 
liberalization improved the overall well-being of all groups in society resists ex ante 
specification. 
Even if we construe well-being in entirely material terms, measurable by income 
or wealth, the outcome remains unclear.  On average, the OECD countries saw modest 
increases in national income and in income inequality during the 1980s and 1990s 
(OECD 2008).  However, there is wide cross-national variation in the extent to which 
income inequality has increased as well as in the income ranges and types of income 
affected.  In some countries, the distribution of earned income is not much more unequal 
today than it was at the beginning of the 1980s.  In others, increases in earnings 
inequality have been offset by redistributive taxes and transfers.  In general, inequality 
across households has increased less than across individuals.  Thus, it is difficult to assess 
well-being on the basis of aggregate figures for income inequality (Gottschalk and 
Smeeding 1997; Pontusson 2005; Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Pontusson and Rueda 
2009).   
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Moreover, income is not synonymous with well-being, and market liberalization 
has effects that extend well beyond income.  When markets become more competitive, 
people who have to sell their labor or goods face greater uncertainty and economic 
insecurity can depress well-being.  Many jobs have become less secure, and many of the 
policy initiatives associated with liberalization, such as shifts away from pension plans 
offering defined benefits, reductions in unemployment benefits, and new limits on health 
benefits have forced many people to bear more of the risks associated with adverse life 
events and economic fluctuations (Taylor-Gooby 2004; Hacker 2004; Hacker et al. 
2010).  
The neo-liberal era has also seen the extension of market logics into ever more 
spheres of the life world (Habermas 1985; Sennett 2006).  An increasing number of 
organizations, ranging from firms to universities and public agencies, are now subject to 
more competitive pressure.   Although reforms of this sort can breathe new life into old 
organizations, they can also put those working in them under more strain (Hochschild 
2003).  They often alter the normative orders embedded in organizational culture, 
subordinating human relationships to competitive concerns (Sauder and Espeland 2009; 
Streeck 2009).  Even family relations have changed, as more children are subjected to 
competitive pressures at ever earlier ages (Hochschild 2003; Levey 2010).   
In short, the market liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s has had wide-ranging 
effects on multiple spheres of life.  By opening up new opportunities, foreclosing others, 
and subjecting people to new pressures, it is likely to have been consequential for well-
being in many ways.  Where can these effects be observed? 
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Shifts in Worldview during the Neo-Liberal Era 
We begin by considering whether the neo-liberal era has had a pervasive impact on the 
worldviews of ordinary people.  Above all else, this era was marked by a shift in reigning 
ideas about the value of market competition.  Underpinning them were changes in the 
doctrines of mainstream economics.  Under the influence of rational expectations theory, 
economists acquired a new skepticism about the value of macroeconomic management 
and discovered a ‘natural’ rate of unemployment reducible only through structural reform 
on the supply-side of the economy (Crystal 1979; Cuthbertson 2000).  Informed opinion 
changed in tandem with these doctrines toward the view that markets are efficient 
allocators of resources and government intervention likely to impede that efficiency.  The 
implications were that people should be paid by their performance and governments 
should not restrict competition or equalize incomes, lest they damage the capacity of 
markets to produce well-being for all. By 1985, the nostrums of the new economics were 
working their way into politics (Blyth 2002; Prasad 2006). 
One notable feature of this movement was the breadth of its influence.  Although 
parties on the political right led the way, they were soon followed by those on the 
mainstream left.  Figure Two shows the movement, in seventeen developed democracies 
from 1945 to 2005, on an index reflecting party positions on eight economic issues 
central to neo-liberalism, such as the appropriate role of state and market in economic 
regulation and the priority to be accorded economic efficiency relative to social 
protection (Iversen 2006; Cusack and Engelhardt 2002).  The solid line in the middle 
indicates the average position on this index of the parties in these legislatures weighted 
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by their share of seats.1
Were these shifts in worldview simply an elite phenomenon or did they reflect 
changes in the beliefs of ordinary people as well?  We are especially interested in three 
issues.  Did neo-liberal ideas induce changes in people’s thinking about how the economy 
should work, how they should behave, and how economic rewards should be distributed? 
The latter touches on what Europeans call ‘social solidarity’, namely, the willingness of 
people to see resources redistributed to those who are less well off (cf. Lane 1972; 
Hochschild 1981; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Boltanski and Chiapello 1999).  
Unfortunately, long runs of relevant data are scarce, but some suggestive answers are 
available from the World Values Survey, which has asked a consistent series of questions 
of nationally-representative samples at five year intervals since 1981.  Although not 
every country was surveyed in every wave, our observations cover eighteen OECD 
countries for a total sample of up to 47,890 respondents.   
  Between 1980 and 1998, legislatures became significantly more 
neo-liberal, as parties on both the right and left moved in that direction. 
There is evidence that market-oriented ideas made important inroads into popular 
beliefs especially during the 1980s.  With regard to how the economy should operate, the 
inclination of people in all income groups to regard ‘competition’ as good rather than 
harmful increased during the early 1990s, and, although support for competition declined 
in the second half of the 1990s, the balance of opinion remains favorable to it (see Figure 
Three).2 With respect to the distribution of economic rewards, consider views about what 
people who perform the same job with different degrees of competence should be paid.  
Market ideology usually specifies that people who perform better should be paid more, a 
view popular among those with higher incomes.  As Figure Four indicates, support for 
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this position increased significantly among people at all levels of income during the 
1980s, and it has remained high ever since. 
  Since market ideology also endorses self-interested behavior, it is notable that 
the proportion of people who think it can be justifiable to avoid paying a fare on public 
transport increased from 33 percent in 1981 to 43 percent in 2005, a thirty percent rise.3
However, market ideas do not appear to have altered fundamental attitudes to 
social solidarity.  Figure Five indicates that people in virtually all income groups across a 
wide range of countries became more supportive of the views that governments should 
take responsibility for providing for everyone and that incomes should be made more 
equal in the wake of the neo-liberal initiatives of the 1990s.
  
In broad terms at least, the market-oriented ideas popularized over the past thirty years do 
seem to have shifted the views of ordinary people about how the economy should 
function and what behavior is appropriate to it. 
4
 
  Responses in successive 
surveys about the role of government reflect similar trends. On a battery of questions 
about whether it is the government’s responsibility to redistribute wealth, provide jobs for 
everyone and benefits for the unemployed and elderly, the majorities supporting such 
measures in OECD countries shift very little between 1985 and 2006; and the proportion 
thinking the government has a responsibility to reduce income differences between the 
rich and the poor increases slightly from 68 percent in 1985 to 74 percent in 2006 (ISSP 
2009).  Although market-oriented ideas have left their mark on the popular imagination, 
they do not seem to have eroded feelings of social solidarity or the belief of a majority of 
citizens in a most OECD countries that governments bear responsibility for securing it. 
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Shifts in Well-Being during the Neo-Liberal Era 
Our primary concern is with well-being.  We use the term ‘well-being’ to denote a 
person’s welfare understood in broad terms, as a multidimensional phenomenon 
encompassing material circumstances, health and security.  In keeping with a substantial 
literature, we measure it by the level of satisfaction people express with their lives 
(Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh 2010; Helliwell et al. 2010).5
How did the experience of neo-liberal reform affect the well-being of ordinary 
people?  Figure Six shows average well-being across eighteen developed democracies for 
three groups whom we will describe as the lower-middle class (at or below the 30th 
percentile in the income distribution), the upper-middle class (at or above the 70th 
percentile) and the middle class (between the other two groups).  In keeping with the 
view that neo-liberal reforms promote prosperity, average well-being increased by a total 
of 3 percent between 1981 and 2005.  However, that increase is modest compared with 
  This instrument allows 
people to define well-being in their own terms and, for assessing the impact of a 
multidimensional phenomenon such as market liberalization, it has advantages over 
narrower indicators that reduce a person’s welfare to income (Sen 1999; Stiglitz et al. 
2009; Nussbaum 2001).  In addition, this approach allows us to evaluate the impact of 
changes in income on well-being.  There is strong evidence that life satisfaction is a good 
indicator for quality of life, reflecting common conditions across national contexts and, in 
our dataset, it is highly-correlated with measures for other factors associated with the 
quality of life, such as health and the household financial situation (for reviews, see 
Veenhoven 1996; Diener et al. 1999; Helliwell 2008). 
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the 1.9 percent increase per year in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for the 
OECD countries over this period.6
More important, the distribution of well-being became significantly more unequal 
over the course of the neo-liberal era.  It is not surprising that the well-being of all three 
income groups improved during the 1980s, since 1981, our base year, came amidst the 
worst global recession since 1945. During the 1990s, however, only the upper-middle 
classes experienced increases in well-being, and the average well-being of the middle and 
lower-middle classes fell during the 1990s and early 2000s.  In short, this was an era of 
winners and losers.  Over these twenty-five years, average well-being increased by 2 
percent for the upper-middle class but declined by 3 percent for the lower-middle class. 
   
While these numbers may seem small, the gap is statistically significant (p = 
0.0396) and striking given how stable national assessments of subjective well-being tend 
to be.  As Easterlin (1974, 1995) and others have shown, those assessments do not move 
much even over decades of economic change; and, at the individual level, changes in 
subjective well-being induced, for instance, by changes in income tend to have a short 
half-life (Di Tella et al. 2010; Suh et al. 1996).  The gap in average well-being between 
the upper-middle and lower-middle classes in 2005 is more than twice the standard 
deviation in the country averages for well-being over this period. 
To what extent is this increase in inequality attributable to liberalization processes 
that made markets more open and competitive as opposed to other developments over 
this period?  Given limitations in the available data, this is an issue we cannot resolve 
definitively.  Some analysts have argued that increases in income inequality were 
inspired by technological change, which privileged those with technical skills relative to 
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the low-skilled.  However, the evidence suggests that technological change accounts at 
best for a small portion of the rise in income inequality in the OECD over this period 
(Harjes 2007; cf. Autor et al. 2005).  Others attribute such distributive effects to the 
increasing flows of trade and capital associated with globalization.  By making low-skill 
production in the developing world more feasible, the opening of global markets 
intensified competition and increased relative returns to skill in the developed world 
(Wood 1994; Leamer 1996; Antras et al. 2006).  However, governments had to decide to 
make international markets more open, and we see the opening of global markets as one 
aspect of broader liberalization processes with political origins.  
Many domestic policies associated with liberalization also had direct 
consequences for the lower middle class.  Efforts to weaken trade unions were largely 
successful. The proportion of the OECD workforce that is unionized dropped from 33 
percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 2008, and the strength of the trade union movement is 
closely correlated with wage levels at the lower end of the income spectrum (Card and Di 
Nardo 2002).  Steps to reduce employment protection and encourage temporary 
employment contracts reduced the job security of large segments of the workforce, as 
increasing turnover rates indicate.  At a basic level, there is a natural class bias to liberal 
reforms.  Reforms that extend the purview of markets often enhance the aggregate 
‘efficiency’ of allocation, but they also privilege those with access to marketable 
resources, such as capital and high levels of skills typical in the upper middle class, 
relative to those without them.   Intensifying market competition magnifies the 
distributive effects that follow from disparities in marketable resources.   
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By contrast, it is unlikely that increasing inequality in well-being stems from the 
two other socioeconomic developments most prominent in this era, namely, the entry of 
women into the paid labor force or the rise of service sector employment.  Although entry 
into the labor force seems to have depressed the life satisfaction of women, women from 
the upper and lower middle classes enter the labor force in roughly similar proportions, 
and we did not find a significant gender-based class difference in our data (Blanchflower 
and Oswald 2004; Stevenson and Wolfers 2009).  Although there is significant cross-
national variation in the types of service sector jobs created, the expansion of service 
sector employment was also a cross-class phenomenon (Esping-Andersen 1999).   
 In sum, one of the most striking features of the neo-liberal era has been a shift in 
the distribution of well-being.  After narrowing slightly in the 1980s across the OECD, 
inequality in well-being increased markedly after 1990, as well-being rose among the 
upper middle classes and stagnated among other groups. 
 
Cross-National Variation in Well-Being  
Although the distribution of well-being became more unequal in most countries in our 
sample over the neo-liberal era, that increase was much larger in some societies than 
others.  How is this cross-national variation to be explained?   
For the purposes of cross-national comparison, we construct an index of 
inequality in well-being that indicates, for each country at each point in time, the ratio of 
the average level of life satisfaction reported by people in the upper-middle class 
(namely, in the top three income deciles) to the average level of life satisfaction reported 
by people in the lower-middle class (in the bottom three income deciles).  We compare 
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well-being across these large groups rather than small bands at the top and bottom of the 
income distribution in order to capture the life situations of a majority of people and to 
minimize the measurement error that might arise from looking at smaller groups.  In 
intuitive terms, a score of 110 on this index means that, for country x at time t, the 
average well-being of people in the upper-middle classes was 10 percent higher than the 
level of well-being among people in the lower-middle classes.  To correct for the 
possibility that people may be culturally less inclined to express satisfaction with their 
life in some countries than others, this measure compares the responses of co-nationals.  
Thus, it provides a measure of inequality in well-being that is broadly comparable across 
countries and time. 
Figure Seven shows the level of inequality in well-being in each of the OECD 
countries in our sample in 2005, and Figure Eight the average annual rate of change in 
this index between 1980 and 2000.  Significant differences are visible.  After two decades 
of the neo-liberal era, the distribution of well-being is more equal in Ireland, Australia, 
Italy and the Netherlands, but relatively unequal in Germany, Denmark, the US and 
Finland.  To appreciate the substantive significance of these inequalities, note that, in our 
sample, the ratio of well-being of a full-time worker compared to that of an unemployed 
worker, whose well-being is typically depressed by unemployment, is 1.17, not so 
different from the ratio across income groups in countries where well-being is distributed 
most unequally (cf. Blanchflower and Oswald 2004: 1373). 
Figure Nine reports each change in well-being in each country in our sample over 
all sub-periods between 1981 and 2005, arrayed from left to right based on the extent to 
which the change marked an increase in inequality in well-being, decomposed into 
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changes in well-being among the upper and lower-middle classes.  The circles show the 
change in well-being over the sub-period among the lower-middle class and the diamonds 
the change among the upper-middle classes.  It is apparent that, where large declines in 
well-being took place (to the right in the diagram), they were attributable mainly to a 
decline in well-being among the lower-middle class. 
Thus, the problem becomes primarily one of explaining why the relative well-
being of the lower-middle class is lower in some times and places than in others.  This is 
likely driven in fundamental ways by the economic situation of the lower middle classes.  
Three types of material factors might matter.  The first is the level of national income: 
where it is higher, everyone should be better off and this might improve the well-being of 
some groups more than others, although we have no ex ante expectation about which 
groups will benefit most.  A second relevant factor is the distribution of income: where it 
is more equal, well-being should be more equally distributed. The third factor is the rate 
of unemployment. Because the incidence of unemployment is typically higher among 
those at lower incomes, where the level of unemployment is lower, the lower-middle 
class may be relatively better off. 
To assess these propositions, we estimate the impact of GDP per capita, the 
standardized rate of unemployment, and the Gini coefficient for the inequality of market 
income prior to taxes and transfers on the index for inequality in well-being, using an 
ordinary least squares regression covering all countries and periods in our sample. Since 
we have few observations for each country, it is not practicable to include country-level 
fixed effects, but we do control for types of welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990).  The 
results are in models 1 and 2 of Table One.7  They suggest that, where market income 
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inequality is higher, inequality in well-being will also be greater.  Higher levels of 
national income may also increase inequality in well-being, suggesting that, at least in 
this period, higher levels of prosperity were shared unequally.  Both coefficients are just 
significant at the .05 level.  Surprisingly, we find no systematic relationship between the 
rate of unemployment and inequality in well-being.8
The country rankings in Figure Seven are intriguing.  While we might expect 
inequality in well-being to be relatively high in countries such as the U.S. and U.K. 
where inequalities in income and health are significant, it is also high in countries such as 
Germany, Denmark and Finland where corresponding inequalities in income and health 
have long been lower and egalitarian political traditions stronger.  To some extent, these 
figures reflect the fact that liberalizing reforms have had an important impact on relative 
well-being even in these countries, but they probably also reflect the way in which 
existing political traditions mediate the experience of such reforms.  Assessments of well-
being are conditioned, not only by circumstances, but also by expectations; and, in 
countries where welfare states have been relatively generous and egalitarian economic 
outcomes more prized, neo-liberal reforms and accompanying increases in income 
inequality may well have depressed the sense of well-being of the lower-middle class 
more than in countries where people were accustomed to higher levels of inequality.   
  These results have to be treated 
with caution because they are not robust to the inclusion of a time-trend, but they suggest 
that income inequality contributes to inequality in well-being, without fully determining 
it, as the low R2 indicates. 
This interpretation is consistent with the findings of Alesina et al. (2004) that 
income inequality reduces the subjective well-being of those in the bottom half of the 
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income distribution more in Europe than in the United States, and it conforms to the fact 
that the coefficients on type of welfare state (in Table One) indicate that, at any given 
level of income inequality, members of the lower-middle class in countries with 
continental or social democratic welfare states are likely to feel less well-off relative to 
members of the upper middle class than their counterparts in the liberal market 
economies (Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001).  Similar considerations may 
explain why inequality in well-being did not increase in Ireland and Spain (see Figure 
Eight).  Both countries experienced economic transformations over this period whose 
fruits likely exceeded the expectations of many in the lower-middle class (McGraw 
forthcoming). 
 
Sources of Social Resilience 
Many people faced challenges to their well-being during the 1980s and 1990s.  Stylizing 
slightly, the intensification of market competition can be seen as an economic shock.  The 
resulting dislocation put the well-being of the lower middle class at particular risk.  
However, the consequent levels of well-being are, not simply a function of the magnitude 
of the shock, but conditioned by the social resilience of those at risk.  The core issue is: 
how is such resilience constituted?  What are the sources of social resilience on which 
people facing more economic insecurity, potential unemployment and declining incomes 
might draw to preserve their well-being in the face of such developments?  For 
approaches to this, we draw on two kinds of theoretical literatures. 
Consider first the individual-level strategies that people can adopt.  Multiple 
literatures suggest that, in challenging situations, individuals turn to other people for 
 16  
support, whether informational, emotional or logistical, often to compensate for the 
material resources they lack.  Studies of life under communism find that, when resources 
are scarce, people seek assistance from their relatives, friends, and colleagues – for help 
in securing goods, small services, and to navigate the bureaucracy (Wedel 1986; Hann 
1993).  Studies in population health find that people who become ill recover more 
quickly if they can rely on close friends or relatives, and people tied into social networks 
enjoy better general health than those who are not (Berkman and Glass 2000, Berkman et 
al. 2000).  Building on Link and Phelan (1995), the contributors to Successful Societies 
(Hall and Lamont 2009) describe social connectedness as a ‘social resource’ on which 
people draw to enhance their capabilities for coping with life challenges.  The inference 
is that social connectedness may be a buffer against increases in the ‘wear and tear’ that 
people experience when markets become more competitive.   
 In order to assess this possibility, we estimate the effect of social connections on 
well-being at the individual level for everyone in our sample between 1980 and 2005, 
using hierarchical linear models with cross-level interactions.  Several kinds of social 
connectedness might matter, ranging from intimate ties to family members, social 
connections to friends, and the relationships that come with membership in voluntary 
associations.  Therefore, we measure social connectedness on three dimensions, based on 
what respondents said about how important ties to family and friends were to them and 
the number of associations to which they belonged.  The estimations contain a range of 
controls for the other factors that might matter to well-being, including income (measured 
by household income decile), type of occupation, employment status, years of education, 
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age and gender. We include time and country fixed effects and look where appropriate 
for non-linear effects. 
 Table Two reports the results.  The material determinants of well-being all have 
the expected effects.  Well-being increases with income but it is lower among unskilled 
and semi-skilled manual workers relative to managers and professionals (not shown) and 
among the unemployed.  With respect to age, well-being has a U-shaped relationship, 
lower among the middle aged than the young but rising again later in life.    However, 
Model 2 shows that all three types of social connectedness also have a statistically-
significant relationship to a person’s well-being in this period.  Ties to family are most 
closely associated with well-being, followed by ties to friends, while membership in 
associations had a smaller but significant effect.  Strong ties to friends improve well-
being as much as a movement up two income deciles would, and strong ties to family 
have an effect on well-being equivalent to a movement up five income deciles.  The 
conclusion we draw is that social connectedness has been an important source of social 
resilience during the neo-liberal era.9
 However, there is a distributive dimension to these results: social connectedness 
matters more for the well-being of the lower-middle class than of the affluent.  In model 
3 of Table Two, we include a term that interacts income with membership in associations.  
The negative coefficient indicates that membership in associations improves well-being 
for people with low incomes more than for those with higher incomes.
 
10 By the same 
token, the poor suffer greater losses in well-being from lower levels of social 
connectedness than do the affluent.  Moreover, social connectedness can be seen as a 
feature of social structure and, just as the economic structure of capitalist societies 
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distributes material resources unequally, the social structure of those societies tends to 
distribute social resources unevenly.  Social connectedness is stratified by social class.  
As Table Three indicates, in virtually all OECD countries, people in higher social classes 
have denser networks of social connections than those in lower social classes.  In sum, 
social connectedness is especially important to the well-being of people in the lower-
middle class but less available to them than to people in the upper-middle class. 
 As Putnam (2001) and others have observed, of course, people may benefit from 
the density of social networks in a community in ways that are independent of their own 
social connections (Schneepers et al. 2002; Sampson et al. 2002); and we find some 
confirmation for this in our multi-level estimations.  The average level of associational 
memberships in a country has a statistically-significant impact on people’s well-being 
independent of their own membership in such associations (model 3 in Table Two).   
 Broadly speaking, these results suggest that some important sources of social 
resilience are rooted in the structure of social relations.  In some respects, however, they 
may reinforce, rather than even out, inequalities in well-being.  If social connectedness is 
especially important to the well-being of people in the lower middle class, it is also 
usually less available to them than to members of the upper middle class; and more 
intense market competition can disrupt these connections, as it does, for instance, when 
people are forced to move to find new employment.  We do not find any general decline 
in social connectedness over this period, but such issues deserve further investigation, as 
do the effects that might follow from cross-national variation in social structure (cf. 
Scheepers et al. 2002; Barnes et al. 2010).  We find that, in countries with denser 
networks of social connections, average well-being is higher, but, where social 
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connectedness is distributed more unequally across income groups, the relative well-
being of the lower-middle class may suffer.   
However, people do not rely solely on individual-level strategies to cope with 
challenges to their well-being.  Those challenges can also be addressed through collective 
action.  We consider two modes of collective action especially relevant to the challenges 
posed by neo-liberalism, namely those that operate through the trade union movement 
and those that democratic governance makes possible. 
The effect of trade unions on well-being is of special interest during the neo-
liberal era, because unions were important sources of resistance to neo-liberal measures 
that would make employment less secure, wage competition more intense and social 
benefits more restrictive.  A large literature suggests that trade unions can improve the 
well-being of their members and, as political actors, they often agitate for measures 
aimed at improving the well-being of the lower middle-class more generally (Freeman 
and Medoff 1984; Hall and Soskice 2001; Radcliff 2005; Flavin et al. 2010).   
Democratic governments were also potentially important vehicles for collective 
response to the challenges of the neo-liberal era.  Some classic views portray democratic 
governments as instruments that harnesses advancing knowledge to a popular will in 
pursuit of a wider social welfare (Beer 1974; Held 2006; Hall 2010).  In the neo-liberal 
era, of course, governments were part of the problem as well as the solution: state-
sponsored initiatives to deregulate markets were central to intensifying market 
competition.  However, as Polanyi (1944) observes, the governance of markets is 
ultimately a double-sided affair.  Governments create markets, but they also offer 
protection from the worst effects of market competition. A failure to do so endangers 
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their chances for reelection, if not the stability of the social order (Pacek and Radcliff 
2008; Flavin et al. 2011).   
Of course, both of these contentions are controversial.  Few doubt that trade 
unions improved the living standards of the workforce in previous eras, but there is 
debate about their benefits during the neo-liberal era (Rueda 2007). A sizeable literature 
sees the efforts of trade unions to raise wage floors, resist lay-offs, and limit the 
reorganization of production as impediments to the well-being delivered by flexible 
markets (Hirsch 2003; Oswald 2005).  Some analysts see democratic governments in 
similar terms, as sectarian agents more likely to deliver rents to their partisans than to 
serve the well-being of the populace as a whole (Bates 1981; Tanzi 2005; Hacker and 
Pierson 2010).  Therefore, these issues deserve empirical scrutiny. 
To assess the contention that trade unions preserved well-being in the face of the 
challenges of the neo-liberal era, we estimate a hierarchical linear model with intercepts 
that vary by country-wave and a wide range of controls for the determinants of well-
being at the individual level.  The results reported in model 4 of Table Two indicate that 
trade union density at the national level, i.e. the proportion of the national workforce 
belonging to unions, is positively associated with the well-being of individuals in these 
countries over this period and statistically-significant at almost the .01 level.11 Moreover, 
this effect is present even when we control for union membership at the individual level.  
In short, trade unions sustain the well-being of large portions of the populace, not simply 
of their own members (see also Flavn et al. 2010).  They operate as factors of social 
resilience by virtue of how they defend social solidarity in the national political economy.  
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Can democratic governments have similar effects?  To examine this possibility, 
we estimate the impact of social spending (as a share of GDP) and of the redistributive 
efforts of governments on the index of inequality in well-being for each of our country 
periods. Our expectation is that social spending will have little effect on inequality in 
well-being.  Although it increased on average in the OECD from 16 percent of GDP in 
1980 to 21 percent in 2005, social spending is a blunt instrument for addressing 
inequalities in well-being because many of its beneficiaries are relatively affluent 
recipients of retirement and other benefits.  By contrast, the government’s redistributive 
effort is much more likely to reduce inequality in well-being because it entails the 
redistribution of income from upper to lower income earners through taxation and 
transfers. As an indicator for redistributive effort, we take the difference between the Gini 
coefficient for household market income (before taxes and transfers) and the Gini 
coefficient for disposable household income (after taxes and transfers) in each period.   
The results are reported in Table One.  As expected, aggregate social spending 
has no effect on inequality in well-being (model 3).  However, model 4 indicates that a 
government’s redistributive efforts reduce inequality in well-being by a substantial 
amount (statistically significant at the .03 level).  We explore the issue further by 
incorporating a term for the government’s redistributive effort into a multi-level model 
for determinants of individual well-being which controls for other factors.  In Table Two 
(model 5), the relevant coefficient is positive and statistically-significant at the .05 level.  
Moving from the minimum to the maximum level of redistribution present in this sample 
increases average well-being by about as much as an increase of $30,000 in average 
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income would. This suggests that the efforts of governments to redistribute resources 
during the neo-liberal era improved the well-being of large segments of the population. 
In other words, democratic governments can also be important sources of social 
resilience for the populace, by virtue of their capacities to redistribute income.  However, 
it should be noted that there is wide variation in the extent to which governments made 
such efforts and controversy over what drives them.  Some attribute the success of 
redistributive coalitions to a country’s electoral rules, others to its longstanding cleavage 
structures and political traditions, or to the organizational power of the political left 
(Huber and Stephens 2001; Swank 2002; Iversen and Soskice 2006; Pontusson and 
Rueda 2009, see also the chapter by Bouchard).  Thus, there are second-order issues to 
this dimension of social resilience that are beyond the scope of this chapter to explore. 
 
Conclusion 
The distribution of well-being has become markedly more unequal during the neo-liberal 
era.  Although overall well-being in the developed democracies increased slightly during 
the 1980s, average well-being among the lower-middle class was only 88 percent of its 
level among the upper-middle class by 2005, down from 92 percent in the early 1980s; 
and in some countries it fell by as much as 17 percent. 
From an egalitarian perspective, this development is cause for concern.  After 
three decades in which democratic welfare states fulfilled their promise to improve well-
being for all, they have presided over three decades in which well-being increased only 
for those in the most privileged strata of society. The fruits of post-industrial capitalism 
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are being distributed less equally today than they were thirty years ago, and the wear and 
tear of daily life has increased for many people.   
However, these developments are troubling from other perspectives as well. In 
particular, they may be contributing to fissures that threaten intractable social conflict.  
One of the achievements of the post-war Keynesian welfare state was to displace class 
conflict from the political arena into the industrial arena, where regularized collective 
bargaining in the context of steady economic growth ultimately muted it (Lipset 1964; 
Offe 1983).  Despite some resurgence in the late 1960s and 1970s, class conflict of the 
sort that dominated interwar politics has never returned (Crouch and Pizzorno 1978; 
Dalton et al. 1984).  Rising in its stead, however, is increasingly bitter conflict over 
immigration and ethnicity.  Across the developed democracies, the principal challenge to 
established political parties comes, not from a radically-egalitarian left, but from a 
radically-nationalist right, incensed to see people of different origins, ethnicities and 
religions take up places in society (Kitschelt 1997).  The many political reflections of this 
movement include the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Swedish 
Democrats and the American Tea Party movement. 
This conflict is normally associated with the effects of globalization and its 
continental counterpart, the European Union, which have promoted increases in 
immigration.  However, levels of immigration alone do not explain much of the variation 
in support for anti-immigrant parties (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000; Van der Brug et al. 
2005; Swank and Betz 2002).  Other factors are at work here.  We suspect that one of 
those factors is the growing discrepancy in well-being between social classes.  Those who 
fan the flames of ethnic division typically draw on the diffuse discontents people feel 
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about their lives, and, among the lower-middle class, twenty years of stagnating well-
being has provided fuel for those flames.   
There is some evidence for this proposition.  Resentment of immigrants has 
increased in the developed democracies since 1980.  While 8.5 percent of people in our 
sample said they would not like to have an immigrant as a neighbor in 1981, 12.2 percent 
said so in 2005, an increase of almost 50 percent.  This trend is notably independent of 
broader changes in values over the period.  Asked whether they would teach their 
children tolerance, in 2005, 83 percent of respondents said they would, compared with 52 
percent in 1981.  Even more telling are the estimations reported in Table Four in which 
we examine the impact of inequality in well-being at the national level on feelings of 
hostility to immigrants (measured by the percent of respondents who mention not 
wanting to have an immigrant or foreign worker as a neighbor) at five points in time 
between 1980 and 2005.  Higher levels of inequality in well-being have a statistically 
significant effect (at about the .05 level) on hostility to immigrants.  By contrast, 
generalized support for tolerance (measured by the percentage of people who say they 
would teach tolerance to their children) has no impact on attitudes to immigrants. 
Although many factors condition hostility to immigrants, including discourse in the 
public realm, where the gap in well-being between the lower- and upper-middle classes is 
larger, hostility to immigrants is likely be more prevalent (cf. Andersen and Fetner 2008). 
In sum, rising inequality in well-being does not simply increase relative 
deprivation.  It also threatens the social solidarity of societies in ways that portend 
growing social conflict.  Support for measures to make incomes more equal, which is one 
indicator for social solidarity, has increased from 41 percent in favor in 1990 to 50 
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percent in 2005; but hostility to immigrants is another indicator of the limits to social 
solidarity, and it has remained high since 1990. 
The concept of social resilience has also been central to our concerns.  In the 
social sciences, there are two quite different literatures on resilience.  One in psychology 
analyzes resilience as an attribute of individuals, usually acquired in childhood or 
adolescence as a result of experience with a caring family or role models in the local 
community.  From this perspective, personal capacities for resilience allow a person to 
retain emotional health and achieve goals, such as good educational results, in the face of 
adversity, such as the loss of a parent or a decline in family income (Schoon 2006, Ungar 
2008).  A second literature in ecology sees resilience as an attribute of a physical or 
human system based on features that allow that system to return to a favorable 
equilibrium in the face of shocks engendered by climate change, plague or other 
environmental developments (Adger 2000; Folke 2006).   
By contrast, we construe social resilience as an attribute of social groups, whether 
understood as communities, nations or social classes, which reflects the ability of the 
group to sustain its well-being in the face of challenges.  This formulation has 
implications for where we look for the sources of social resilience.  It directs our attention 
to experiences the group has in common and to the institutional or cultural frameworks 
that structure them.  We see the factors structuring relationships within and between 
groups as key mediators of their response to change. 
Several dimensions of these institutional and cultural frameworks have the 
potential to confer resilience on a social group.  These include some we have not 
examined here, such as the collective narratives that are constitutive elements of a 
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group’s identity, the shape of a society’s status hierarchy, and various features of its 
collective organization that condition the potential for mobilization (Bouchard 2003; 
Lamont 2000; Cornell and Kalt 2000; Barnes et al. 2010; Putnam 2000).  Because of the 
data available to us, we have put special emphasis on the dimensions of social structure 
associated with social connectedness.  Social connectedness emerges here as a crucial 
social resource intimately linked to social resilience.  Our findings suggest it has been 
especially important to the capacity of members of the lower-middle class to sustain their 
well-being during the neo-liberal era, and there would be real value in looking more 
closely at how it varies across countries and over time (Barnes et al. 2010). 
 We have also argued that trade unions and democratic governments can be 
significant factors of social resilience, namely, vehicles for collective response to 
socioeconomic challenges capable of sustaining the well-being of ordinary people.  Our 
observations about trade unions are especially consequential in light of the dramatic 
losses in membership they have suffered during the neo-liberal era (Pinto and Beckfield 
2011; Baccaro and Howell 2011).  If our findings are correct, many societies are losing 
one of their most important sources of social resilience.  In the same vein, this analysis 
carries implications for how we view democratic governance.  As Beer (1974) observed 
some decades ago, in principle, democratic governments can be vehicles for the 
formulation and implementation of common purposes.  In many instances, they are no 
more efficient at this than capitalist economies are at securing economic growth, but, 
from the standpoint of resilience, democratic governments provide a capacity for 
concerted response not present in other biological systems; and there is scope for 
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exploring further the conditions under which they are indeed sources of social resilience 
(cf. Mayntz and Scharpf 1987).   
Finally, our analysis points to the value of looking further into well-being, its 
distribution and determinants.  Although many studies emphasize how the distribution of 
income changed during the neo-liberal era, its initiatives conditioned well-being in other 
important ways.  Assessments of well-being raise inevitable measurement issues, but they 
hold the potential for developing a better understanding of the contribution that non-
material, as well as material, factors make to social welfare (Stiglitz et al. 2009).  There 
are important research agendas here worth pursuing. 
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FIGURE ONE: Movement in indicators of liberalization, 1980-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Indices are constructed from OECD measures for product market regulation, employment 
protection, percent of the labor force in trade unions, and exports and imports as a share of GDP. 
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Notes: The solid middle line indicates the mean position of legislators on an economic ideology 
index where higher values reflect more market-oriented policy positions..  The top and bottom 
lines indicate the mean position of parties on the right and left of the political spectrum on this 
index. The dotted line indicates the balance of seats in the legislatures held by parties classified 
by experts as being on the left and right of the political spectrum.   
 
Source: Data provided by Torben Iversen.  See also Iversen 2006. 
 
FIGURE TWO: Change in Party Positions on the Economic Ideology     
Index, 1945-2005 
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FIGURE THREE: Views about whether competition is good or harmful  
          across three income groups 
 
 
       1989−1993                         1994−1999                          1999−2004                          2005−2006  
                                                                   WVS Wave  
 
 
 
 Note: Values on the Y axis indicate the mean score on a scale of 1 to 10 where ‘harmful’ 
           Is 1 and ‘good’ is 10. 
 
 Source: World Values Survey. 
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      FIGURE FOUR: Percent of people who think it fair to pay the ablest 
         more (by income group) 
 
      1981−1984        1985−1988        1989−1993        1994−1999        1999−2004      2005−2006 
 
                                                                             WVS Wave 
 
 
 
Note: Figures on the Y axis are percent who think it is fair to give more to pay to 
 those who perform better rather than offer the same pay for the same job. 
 
Source: World Values Survey 
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FIGURE FIVE:  Views about the responsibilities of the state and income equality  
                          by income decile  
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          FIGURE SIX: Level of well-being over time in three income groups 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, World Values Survey 
 
 34  
FIGURE SEVEN: Inequality in well-being between the upper-middle class 
                             and lower-middle class in 2005   
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     FIGURE EIGHT: Average annual change in inequality in well-being, 1985-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36  
 
FIGURE NINE: Changes in well-being of the lower-middle and upper-middle 
                          classes across each period from 1980-2005 in the OECD 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The Y axis indicates the magnitude of change in well-being from the previous period.  
Figures above the line are positive and below the line negative changes. The solid diamonds 
indicate change in well-being of people with incomes at p70 and above. The circles indicate 
changes in well-being of people with incomes at p30 and below over the same period. Each line 
indicates changes in one country over one time period. 
 
Source: World Values Survey. 
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TABLE ONE: The material determinants of inequality in well-being in OECD countries  
 
 
             Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Intercept)    0.90 * 
  0.08    
  0.82 * 
  0.07   
  0.81 *   
  0.09 
  0.58 *   
  0.09 
GDP/capita 
(00000s) 
 0.14 
 0.1 
  0.23 *  
  0.11  
 0.22 
 0.13 
  0.12 
  0.09 
Unemployment
Rate   
 0.11 
 0.04 
 0.27 
 0.39 
                      
Inequality 
(Prefisc gini) 
 0.37 *  
 0.15  
 0.43 *   
 0.17 
 0.52 *   
 0.21 
  1.31 *   
  0.24 
Social spending 
(00000s)   
                       -0.27 
(0.79) 
           
 
Redistributive 
Effort     
                                  -0.93 *  
  0.23 
Mediterranean             -0.01 
  0.02 
 -0.02 
  0.02 
 -0.01 
  0.02 
Social 
Democratic 
            0.03 
 0.02 
  0.04 
  0.03 
  0.12 *   
  0.03 
Continental             0.05 *  
 0.02  
  0.05 *   
  0.02 
  0.09 *   
  0.02 
 N          52 52 52 52 
R2        0.14 0.35 0.35 0.53 
adj. R2   0.09 0.27 0.26 0.46 
Resid. sd    0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 
 
Note: Standard errors in italics below the coefficient.  Levels of statistical significance indicated as follows: 
* = .10, ** = .05, *** = .001.  The omitted type of welfare state is Liberal. 
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TABLE TWO: Individual-level and country-level determinants of individual well-being. 
                           Hierarchical linear models 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Country-Level Variables 
Rate of 
Unemplmt 
7.97** 
3.34 
  2.63 
3.71 
 
GDP/capita (000s) 0.02** 
0.01 
  0.02 
0.01 
 
Income 
Inequality  
-5.04** 
 1.65 
  -3.21* 
 1.79 
-4.28** 
 1.71 
Redistributive 
Effort  
    1.53* 
0.68 
Level of  
Assoc Mbrshp 
  0.19* 
0.08 
  
Trade Union 
Density 
   0.99* 
0.41 
 
Individual-Level Variables 
(Intercept)  8.21** 
0.79 
7.13** 
0.15 
7.27** 
0.18 
7.77** 
0.78 
8.65** 
0.74 
Association 
Membership 
0.17** 
0.02 
0.07** 
0.01 
0.15** 
0.01 
 0.17** 
0.02 
Ties 
to Family 
 0.5** 
0.03 
   
Ties to Friends  0.22** 
0.02 
   
AM:Income 
Interaction 
-0.01** 
 0 
 -0.01** 
 0 
 -0.01** 
 0 
Years of Education  0.01 
0.02 
-0.01 
 0.01 
-0.01 
 0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
0.01 
Years of. education 
^2  
0 
0 
0 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Unemployed  -0.73** 
 0.06 
-0.78** 
 0.05 
-0.79** 
 0.05 
-0.82** 
 0.05 
-0.77** 
 0.05 
Income  0.14** 
0.01 
0.1** 
0 
0.12** 
0 
0.12** 
0 
0.13** 
0.01 
Female  0.02** 
0.02 
-0.03 
 0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
0.03 
0.02 
0.01 
0.02 
Age  -0.03** 
 0.0 
-0.03** 
 0 
-0.03** 
0 
-0.03** 
0 
-0.03 
 0 
Age^2  0** 
0 
0** 
0 
0** 
0 
0** 
0 
0** 
0 
      
N obs 26966 38411 38874 31964 29044 
N groups 40 54 55 48 41 
AIC 107479 152724 155279 127882 116107 
BIC 107684 152920 155476 128083 116306 
 
Notes: Intercepts vary by country-wave.  Standard errors are in italics below the coefficient.  Statistical 
significance indicated as follows: * = .05, ** = .01. 
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TABLE THREE:  The relationship between social class and social connectedness 
 
 
 
 
    Source: World Values Survey. 
 
   Notes: Higher values on the family/friends index indicate ties to family/friends are more important to the 
   person; for details see Barnes et al. 2010.  The indicator ‘spend time socially’ averages responses from 
   each class to questions asking if respondents ever spend time with colleagues from work or with people at 
   sport, cultural or communal organizations. 
 
 
  
Ties to 
Friends/Family 
 
(Waves 2 & 5) 
 
Membership in 
Associations 
 
(Waves 2 & 5) 
 
Ever Feel  
Lonely  
 
(Wave 1) 
 
 
Spend Time 
Socially 
 
(Wave 4) 
 
Social Class 
 
Index Score 
 
Mean Number 
 
% Frequently 
or Sometimes 
 
%  Not at All 
 
Professional-Managerial 
 
 
 5.33 
 
    2.2 
 
 28 
 
31  
 
White Collar Office 
Workers  (C1) 
 
 
 5.25 
 
 
    2.09 
 
 
 
  35 
 
 
32  
 
Skilled Manual  
Workers (C2) 
 
  
 5.16 
 
     
     1.8 
 
   
  33 
 
 
41  
 
Unskilled, Semi-Skilled 
Manual (DE) 
 
 
 5.09 
 
 
    1.61 
 
 
  42 
 
 
58  
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TABLE FOUR: The impact of inequality in well-being on hostility to immigrants  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of statistical significance 
                   indicated as follows: * = .10, ** = .05 
 
 
 Model 1  Model 2   Model 3  
(Intercept)   -0.23 
  0.15 
  -0.21 
  0.15 
  -0.21 
  0.15 
GDP per Capita 
(00000s)  
 -0.06 
  0.10 
  -0.01 
  0.01 
  -0.01 
  0.01 
Inequality in 
Well-Being  
 -0.32* 
  0.14 
  -0.27* 
  0.13 
  -0.27* 
  0.13 
Value of 
Tolerance  
     -0.00 
  0.05 
Mediterranean    0.00 
(0.02) 
   0.00 
  0.02 
Social 
Democratic 
   0.00 
 0.02 
   0.00 
  0.02 
Continental    0.03 
 0.02 
   0.03 
  0.02 
N   66    66 
  
   66 
  
R2   .08   .15 
 
   .15 
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1  The dotted line shows the relative balance in these legislatures between parties on the political left 
and right as classified by experts.  We are grateful to Torben Iversen for sharing this data. 
 
2  The high income group is people with incomes at the 70th percentile and above; low income is at 
the 30th percentile and below, and the middle income group is those in between. 
 
3  It remains an open question how profound or pervasive this shift in views has been.  There has 
been no analogous increase, for instance, in the numbers deeming it justifiable to cheat on their taxes. 
 
4  The countries included in the statistics given in Figure Five include: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Finland, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, the UK and the US. 
 
5  The relevant question asks ‘All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole 
these days?’ to which a response is given ranging from 1 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely 
satisfied). 
 
6  To secure comparability with our calculations for the change in average well-being, for this 
figure, GDP per capita is averaged across countries unweighted for the size of their population. 
 
7  This time-series data presents the usual problems for causal inference.  For instance, inequality in 
the UK in 2005 is not independent of inequality in 2000. Because we have a small panel, we cannot isolate 
statistically significant effects when a lagged-dependent variable is included, although the point estimates 
retain the signs indicated in Table One. Thus, the coefficients should be interpreted with caution.  Using 
panel-corrected standard errors to allow for panel  heteroskedasticity, however, tends to reduce the standard 
errors and leave all substantive interpretations intact. 
 
8  Note, however, that higher levels of unemployment depress average levels of well-being, as 
indicated in the results of estimations of a hierarchical linear model reported in model 1 of Table Two.  
Higher levels of income inequality also have a large effect on average well-being.  The movement from the 
highest to the lowest levels of income inequality in our sample is associated with an improvement in 
average well-being equivalent to that obtained by increasing per capita income by about $50,000. 
 
9  An important literature in psychology argues that subjective well-being is also mediated by 
various features of personality.  Longitudinal studies from this perspective find that subjective well-being is 
conditioned for some time by life events such as unemployment (Suh et al. 1996; Clark et al. 2008). 
Personality is unlikely to explain the variations in well-being across time in the large social groups in which 
we are interested.  However, to control for it, in estimations not reported here, we have included a variable 
measuring ‘self-mastery’, widely-seen as a dimension of personality linked to well-being.  We find that 
self-mastery has a statistically-significant effect on well-being at the individual level and including it 
attenuates the size of our point estimates on ties to family, friends and associational memberships, but the 
latter continue to have a statistically-significant impact on well-being in terms substantively similar to those 
reported here. 
 
10  Conversely, low income has more damaging effects on the well-being of people with few social 
connections than on those who are well-connected.   
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11  The results are similar using either the OECD measure for trade union density or a measure 
derived from the WVS samples. 
 
